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1 Introduction
In the 1980s and early 1990s earnings inequality rose in several OECD coun-
tries, particularly in the USA and UK (Levy and Murnane, 1992; Machin,
1998). This discovery has generated much research about the extent, causes
and consequences of inequality. One important question is whether individual
wage mobility can at least partly oset the increase in cross-sectional inequality
(Atkinson et al., 1992; Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999; Dickens, 2000). Otherwise it
would have to be associated with a rising inequality of lifetime earnings. A sec-
ond issue is whether mobility contributes to the adjustment of macroeconomic
shocks. The evidence concerning the development of wage inequality for several
OECD countries is mixed. However, the degree of wage mobility is relatively
uniform across countries (Aaberge et al., 1996; OECD, 1996, 1997).
We analyse the degree of wage mobility for Austria by presenting measures of
wage mobility for the period 1986 to 1996. We use administrative data from
the social security records. These data give the most accurate wage information
on individual basis that is available. Moreover, there is a low sample attrition
rate compared to panel data sets collected on an interview basis.However wages
are top coded due to the contribution assessment ceiling of the social security
system, which aects some mobility measures.
National labour market institutions play an essential role for the determination
of labour market outcomes. In continental Europe most workers have their
wages set as a result of collective agreements negotiated between trade unions
and employers. According to the Calmfors and Drill (1988) hypothesis there
is a hump shaped relationship between the degree of centralisation of wage set-
ting and the rate of unemployment. Countries with economy-wide coordination
as well as countries with the lowest degree of coordination should show the most
favourable outcomes.
There is consensus that Austria represents the quintessence of a corporatist
economy and for this reason labour market outcomes in Austria are considered
by several authors (Fuess and Millea, 2001; Pekkarinen et al., 1992; Teulings
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and Hartog, 1998). Many observers, for example the OECD, have pointed
to the high aggregate real wage exibility in Austria as a major reason for
the favourable labour market performance. On the other hand, Hofer et al.
(2001) nd that relative wage structures, e.g. industry wage dierentials and
the returns to education and experience, appear to be rather rigid in Austria.
An explanation for these ndings might be that the pronounced exibility on
the macro level reduces the demand for micro exibility (Teulings and Hartog,
1998). As a consequence of reduced micro exibility we might expect to nd
low levels of wage mobility in Austria.
Evidence about the Austrian level and development of wage inequality is rela-
tively scarce and to our knowledge no studies about wage mobility exist. Be-
blo and Knaus (2000) report that within the Euro-area income is most equally
distributed in Austria, France, Germany and Netherlands. Income inequal-
ity slightly increased between the mid-1980's and mid-1990's, somewhat more
among the working-age than the retirement-age population (Forster, 2000).
Gusenleitner et al. (1998), using data for 1972 to 1991 nd that the wage distri-
bution in Austria narrowed from 1971-80, but widened from 1980-91. Decompo-
sition of the overall trend into sex and skill categories shows that within-group
changes explain most of the developments.
Our results show that according to all applied measures the degree of wage
mobility is low in Austria. In comparison to other OECD countries robust
indices, based on quintile transitions of men, place Austria next to France and
Germany at the bottom of the country ranking. The equalising eect of wage
mobility is about half as large as in other OECD countries. Inequality measured
by the mean log deviation index is reduced only by 10 per cent when averaging
over 11 years. Further, we nd a high mobility only for young workers and
for workers who changed their employer at least once during the observation
period. In Austria women are a highly immobile group although their wages
are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. Decomposing the sample
into sex, age and worker-type groups and comparing within- and between-group
mobility shows that most of the equalising eect of mobility occurs within the
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groups.
In the following section we describe the data set. Section 3 provides an overview
of selected inequality and mobility measures. Section 4 presents results from
the analysis of the degree of wage mobility in Austria. We relate our results
to comparative studies by the OECD (1996, 1997) for the period 1986-1991.
Further we extend the empirical analysis for Austria to the period 1986-1996.
At the end of the section we conduct some sensitivity analysis to evaluate the
eect of top coding on the mobility measures. The nal section summarises
and concludes.
2 Data description
We use a random sample drawn from the social security records in Austria.
Our sample contains data on the social status of the individuals for every day
covering the years 1986 to 1996. The social security authority collects detailed
information for all workers in Austria, except for self-employed, civil servants
and marginal workers. There are major advantages of using such administrative
data compared to the analyses based on surveys. First, there is no outow apart
from death and migration and inow is random. Hence sample attrition, which
is often considerable in longitudinal surveys, is not an issue in administrative
data
1
. Another advantage is that one gets a highly reliable measurement of
income of individuals, because the recall of individuals regarding their incomes
is very unlikely to be better than the information from the social security au-
thority. A nal advantage is that administrative datasets are often very large.
Our total sample contains 72,933 persons, who have been in the labour force
at least for one day between 1986 and 1996. We use only individuals for whom
nonzero earnings are available and who were employed for at least 180 days
per year. For the period 1986 to 1996 (1986 to 1991) our sample size is 14,912
1
However, self-selection due to economic reasons might still aect empirical results. Individ-
uals may endogenously on wages terminate employment, become self employed, unemployed
or withdraw from the labour force.
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(21,942) workers.
As the data are collected for social security reasons there are several short-
comings for empirical analyses. Earnings data are top coded because of the
contribution assessment ceiling in the social security system. The sample we
use for the analyses contains at most 15% censored wage observation per year.
Further, the number of observable worker characteristics is rather scarce, we
have no information on schooling, working time and family aliation. Because
of the lack of information on working time, we cannot calculate wage rates. In
our analyses wage mobility is examined in terms of monthly earnings. These
are calculated as annual earnings divided by months of work.
As we compare our empirical results on wage mobility in Austria with results
for other countries in studies by the OECD (1996, 1997), we put huge eort in
obtaining a sample which is consistent with the OECD data sources. The OECD
used data sets based on both administrative sources and surveys (household or
establishment based). The earnings measure is the monthly wage rate of full-
time workers, calculated from gross earnings of dependent wage and salary
workers. For all countries (except Finland) part-time workers are excluded
from the analysis. Only individuals for whom continuous earnings histories are
available throughout the period are included in the samples.
3 Methods of mobility measurement
3.1 Measures based on transition matrices
One method of analysing income mobility is to dene n income states in the
rst and last year of the observation period and to look at the corresponding
transition matrix P . The elements p
ij
present the probability of transferring to
state j for those starting in state i. We dene income states as quintiles of the
contemporaneous income distribution. With this denition we also avoid the
problem of top coding in the data. Shorrocks (1978b) suggests some mobil-
ity indices based on the transition matrix and discusses their properties. These
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indices determine the dynamic structure if the process governing transitions fol-
lows a Markov chain. Geweke et al. (1987) extend the discussion to continuous
time Markov chains. We use the following indices:
The trace index is dened as
M
T
(P ) =
n  trace(P )
n  1
(1)
and is related to the mean exit time from state i, which is
1
1 p
ii
.
2
Bartholomew's index calculates the the average number of quintile jumps weighted
by the equilibrium distribution P = .
M
B
(P ) =
n
X
i=1

i
n
X
j=1
p
ij
ji  jj (2)
The second eigenvalue index makes it possible to compare dierent time periods
under the assumption that the underlying process is a Markov chain. If 
2
is
the second largest eigenvalue (ordered by absolute value), the second eigenvalue
index is dened by
M
E
(P ) = 1  j
2
j (3)
Mobility measures based on transition matrices are highly robust against data
contamination (Cowell and Schluter, 1998) and also against irregularities in
the samples for cross country comparisons. However, the robustness comes at
the cost of using a rather limited amount of information for their construction.
First, the distance of the move between categories is not taken into account in
the calculations
3
. Second, emphasis is based only on the comparison of wages in
two years and many details of the earnings history are lost. Hence we introduce
a second class of mobility measures tracking earnings over the full period.
2
M
T
(P ) can be written as
P
n
i=1
(1 p
ii
)=(n 1) which is the inverse of the harmonic mean
of the mean length of stay scaled by n=(n   1).
3
This although it might be of great importance for mobility, is nevertheless an advantage
for comparative purposes across countries.
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3.2 Summary measures
This group of mobility indices describe the relationship of wage inequality and
mobility. As individuals change their relative position in the income distribution
over time, it is plausible that income aggregated over several time periods will
be less unequal than in a single time period. The idea is that the measure of
inequality of aggregate income captures dynamic inuences of mobility as well
as inequality. Further, variation in ow variables like income depends on the
length of the accounting period chosen. It is commonly supposed that inequality
of aggregate income falls, as the accounting period is lengthened. Following
this approach Shorrocks (1978a) suggests to measure mobility by the extent to
which the income distribution is equalised as the accounting period is extended.
We have income given for N individuals over T years and write this as a matrix
Y = (y
it
) where y
it
is i's income in year t and the distribution of income in year
t is given by the vector y
t
= (y
1t
; : : : ; y
Nt
). Based on a measure of inequality
I(y
t
) for a given year t we estimate the extent to which the index I(:) is lower
for income averaged over T > 1 years compared with income in a single year.
We calculate i's average income by y
T
i
= 1=T
P
T
t=1
y
it
and denote the average
distribution of income by y
T
= (y
T
1
; : : : ; y
T
N
). Then we express the inequality of
these \smoothed" incomes as a proportion of a weighted average of single-year
inequality. We use 
t
=
P
N
i=1
y
it
=
P
T
t=1
P
N
i=1
y
it
, the share of total earnings
that accrued in year t, as weights and calculate the ratio
R(Y ) =
I(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)
(4)
which measures the rigidity of the income system. The associated mobility
index is then
M
S
(Y ) = 1 R(Y ) (5)
The calculation of the index requires two choices: an inequality index and the
number of time intervals over which to aggregate. Varying the index I(y
t
) and
T , the length of the time interval, gives us more information on the structure
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of income mobility than a single index. We choose several inequality measures
which place emphasis on dierent portions of the income distribution. Further,
we compute M
S
(Y ) for T = 2 to T = 11 and plot the results graphically. For
measuring inequality we use the Gini coecient
I
gini
(y) =
1
2N
2
y
N
X
i=1
N
X
j=1
jy
j
  y
i
j (6)
and inequality measures from the general entropy class, which are dened by
GE

(y) =
1
N
1
(  1)
N
X
i=1

y
i
y


  1

(7)
with sensitivity parameter  6= 0; 1. A higher  means that the index is more
sensitive with respect to inequality in the upper part of the distribution. Mean
income is denoted by y. From this group we choose the mean log deviation
measure, the Theil1 and Theil2 indices
GE
0
(y) = I
mld
(y) =
1
N
N
X
i=1
log

y
y
i

(8)
GE
1
(y) = I
theil1
(y) =
1
N
N
X
i=1
y
i
y
log

y
i
y

(9)
GE
2
(y) = I
theil2
(y) =
1
2N
N
X
i=1
"

y
i
y

2
  1
#
(10)
Taking into account dierent patterns of wage inequality within groups of indi-
viduals with the same observable characteristics, we can decompose the mobil-
ity measure into between and within components. Inequality indices from the
general entropy class have the property of additive subgroup decomposability.
Suppose we have K dierent groups of individuals, such that each individual
belongs to exactly one group. The number of individuals in the k-th group
is n
k
,
P
K
k=1
n
k
= N , and the inequality index within this group is denoted by
GE
k
. The general entropy measures can then be decomposed into parts, which
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describe inequality within groups and inequality between groups (Shorrocks,
1980):
GE

(y) = GE
W

(y) +GE
B

(y) =
K
X
k=1
w
k
GE
k
(y) +GE
B

(y) (11)
with
w
k
=

n
k
N


y
k
y


The within part of inequality is a weighted sum of the indices applied to the
groups separately. Between group inequality is found by applying the index to
the mean wages of the groups. We can think of between inequality as the part of
inequality which can be explained by the observable individual characteristics.
If we require further that the weights in the within part w
k
sum to unity, we
can nd a decomposition for the mean log deviation index and the Theil1 index
by
GE
W
0
(y) =
K
X
k=1
n
k
N
GE
0k
(y) (12)
GE
W
1
(y) =
K
X
k=1
n
k
y
k
N y
GE
1k
(y) (13)
Using this property of the inequality indices, we can decompose the mobility
index into a between and within part by
M
S
(Y ) = 
W
M
W
S
(Y ) + 
B
M
B
S
(Y ) (14)
with
M
W
S
(Y ) = 1 
I
W
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
W
(y
t
)
M
B
S
(Y ) = 1 
I
B
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
B
(y
t
)

W
=
P
T
t=1

t
I
W
(y
t
)
P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)

B
=
P
T
t=1

t
I
B
(y
t
)
P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)
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This is shown by

W
"
1 
I
W
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
W
(y
t
)
#
+ 
B
"
1 
I
B
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
B
(y
t
)
#
=

W
+ 
B
  
W
I
W
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
W
(y
t
)
  
B
I
B
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I
B
(y
t
)
=
P
T
t=1

t

I
W
(y
t
) + I
B
(y
t
)

P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)
 
I
W
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)
 
I
B
(y
T
)
P
T
t=1

t
I(y
t
)
=
1  [R
W
(Y ) +R
B
(Y )] = 1 R(Y ) =M
S
(Y )
Tracking earnings over the full period restricts the sample to individuals for
whom continuous wage histories are available and the calculations of these mea-
sures are based on relatively stable earnings careers. Contrary to the indices
based on transition between quintiles the summary indices M
S
are aected by
the top coding in the data. We conduct some sensitivity analyses to get a
quantitative assessment of the extent to which the calculations are aected by
censoring and present the results in the empirical part (section 4.3).
4 Results
The rst part of the empirical analyses concerns a comparison of wage mobility
in Austria with other OECD countries. We draw on studies of the OECD
(1996, 1997) covering eight OECD countries and calculate similar measures of
wage mobility for Austria. The OECD studies cover the period 1986-1991. Sub-
sequently we perform the analysis of wage mobility for Austria for the extended
period up to 1996. This longer time horizon should give a better estimate of
the equalising eect of wage mobility.
4.1 Comparison of mobility among OECD countries: 1986-1991
A summary of measures for earnings mobility in Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK, USA, and Austria between 1986 and 1991 are
presented in Table 1. Mobility is examined by the evaluation of transition
9
matrices. The OECD put emphasis on full-time wage and salary earners. No
information on working-time is available in the Austrian data and therefore, we
consider all workers.
4
In the examination of transition matrices we include all
individuals, who were employed more than 180 days in both years relevant for
the transitions, but not necessarily throughout the observation period. Thus
we have a sample size of 24,927 instead of 21,942 for the 1986-1991 period.
Table 1 presents results from the transition matrix analysis. The rst column
gives measures of cross sectional inequality in 1991. According to the ratio of the
90th to the 10th wage percentile the countries with highest wage inequality are
the USA, UK and France. The other European countries show smaller values
of inequality. If we turn to columns 2 to 5, which examine quintile moves in the
wage distribution between 1986 and 1991, we cannot nd clear evidence for the
presumption that countries with highest inequality also have the highest wage
mobility. Denmark and Finland appear to be the most mobile countries and
France is among the most immobile ones. Approximately half of the workers in
all of the countries were in a dierent earning quintile in 1991 than in 1986, and
between 7 and 22 per cent moved at least two quintiles up or down. Excluding
Austria and Finland, the range shrinks from 11 to 15 per cent.
The results in Table 1 suggest that Austria has by far the lowest rate of wage
mobility. To nd an explanation for this result we examine the transition ma-
trices for men and women more closely
5
. It turns out that about 40% of women
are in the bottom quintile in both years and this is at the same time the most
persistent state for women. Their retention rate
6
in the rst quintile is 78%.
Consequently only a small percentage of men is in the bottom quintile and for
them transitions from the rst quintile to higher ones are much more likely.
4
The OECD (1997) reported similar results for full-time workers and for the total work
force. Part-time work is very unusual for men in Austria. For women, the share of part-time
work is below the European average. The share of part-time work 1990 was 20% for women
and 1.5% for men; it was rising during the 1990's.
5
All transition matrices are available from the authors upon request.
6
We refer to the retention rate as percentage of those in a quintile in 1986 who are still in
the same quintile in 1991, as opposed to transition rates between dierent quintiles.
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One can argue that this nding is due to the large share of part-time work
among women for which we cannot correct. Therefore we examine transitions
of men in the male wage distribution in the next step. The results are given
in columns 6 to 9 of Table 1. For men a comparison of Austria with the other
countries shows that wage mobility in Austria is low but similar to mobility
in countries like France. Low wage mobility in Austria is especially due to the
small probability of moving more than one wage quintile within 6 years.
Next we examine the extent to which wage mobility reduces cross-sectional wage
inequality observed in a single year by the framework introduced in section 3.2.
In Table 2 the summary mobility index M
S
is represented as the percentage
reduction in inequality when four dierent indices of wage inequality are used.
A value of zero indicates no equalising eect from wage mobility, because wages
averaged over a multi-year period are no more equally distributed than wages
in a single year. From the results in Table 2 we learn that earnings inequality
falls as earnings are averaged over a six-year period. In the country comparison
the overall equalising eect of mobility is always less than one-third and most
often around 10 per cent. This suggests that a large share of cross-sectional
wage inequality is quite persistent. Moreover, the choice of the inequality index
matters. The indices dier in the implicit weighting they place on inequality
at dierent points in the distribution. The mean log deviation index is most
sensitive to inequality near the bottom of the distribution; the Gini index is
most sensitive in the middle, the Theil2 index at the top, and the Theil1 index
at both extremes of the distribution. For all countries, the Gini index indicates
a much weaker equalising eect than the other three indices. This suggests
that workers in the middle of the income distribution have relatively stable
earnings. Wage dierentials are smoothed by mobility mainly at the tails of the
distribution.
Leaving out Austria country rankings in Table 2 depend on the chosen inequality
index and there emerges no clear picture which countries are the most mobile or
most immobile ones. For Austria Table 2 conrms the results from above with
respect to the weak equalising eect of earnings mobility. However, Austria
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has by far the lowest mobility according to all inequality indices. Applying the
mean log deviation index we nd that inequality is reduced by 6.6 per cent
when income is averaged over 6 years. For all other countries, the equalising
eect is about twice as large as for Austria (see also Figure 2).
An evident question is if this outstanding result is due to the problems with our
dataset, namely the inclusion of part-time workers and the top coding of wages.
First we note that the result seems not mainly to depend on the inclusion of
part-time workers. Considering annual earnings (instead of wage rates) of all
continuously employed workers, presented in the bottom of Table 2, does not
change the picture for wage mobility in Austria. Second, for an assessment of
the eect of top coding it is useful to study the results for dierent population
groups and single out low wage groups who are less aected by censoring e.g.
young workers and women.
Table 3 shows that the equalising eect diers among groups. For all countries
the strongest equalising eect appears among workers under the age of 25 in
the initial period. Youth's earnings paths are relatively volatile, which may
reect job-shopping. We note that the value of mobility for young workers
is also maximal from all groups in Austria and although it is the smallest in
country comparison, its dimension is not out of range
7
. The equalising eect of
mobility is above average for workers changing employers at least once during
1986 and 1991. For this group the index for Austria ts in the range of the
other countries values' too
8
. The picture is less clear if we move attention to
the dierences between the sexes. For all countries except Austria and the UK,
where the relationship is reversed, women are considerably more mobile than
men. Although a high share of female part-time workers are included in the
Austrian dataset, who might be more mobile due to changes in hours worked,
the index is less than half of the other countries' (except UK). We might think of
at least three possible explanations for the reverse pattern of female/male wage
mobility in Austria. First, the subsamples suer from dierent problems in the
7
The exceptional value for Germany is due to the inclusion of apprentices in the data.
8
The group of workers changing their employer may be highly correlated with young age.
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dataset, which might impair the comparability of indices. As already mentioned
part-time is higher among women and wage censoring is higher among men.
Second, we only include individuals employed more than 180 days in the sample,
which restricts attention to very stable female careers where any leaves due to
maternity are excluded. Third, as we have mentioned above, female wages are
concentrated on the bottom of the wage distribution and the chosen indices
may still be relatively insensitive to movements at the very bottom.
For further investigation of the eect of wage censoring on the summary indices,
we conduct some sensitivity analysis to evaluate the magnitude of the eect.
We refer the reader to section 4.3.
4.2 Wage mobility in Austria: 1986-1996
An observation period of six years is very short compared to the total time an
individual spends on average in the labour force. Therefore it is most interesting
to extend this period to get a better approximation of the eect of mobility on
lifetime income inequality. We can do this for Austria where we have data
available from 1986 to 1996. We conduct our analysis solely for individuals
with nonzero earnings in all eleven years. The sample size is reduced to 14,912
(resp. 19,504 for the transition matrix based analyses). Descriptive statistics
of the variables used are given in Table 7.
For the extended time period the results from the previous section are repeated
in Tables 4 and 5. As expected, mobility increases over the longer period, but
the general picture remains unchanged. The additional mobility indices based
on the transition matrices M
T
;M
B
and M
2
show again that young workers
and workers who experienced at least one employer change are the most mobile
groups (Table 4). Most likely these groups are highly correlated and it would be
interesting to examine the eects of employer changes for dierent age groups
or positions in the labour market career. We leave this issue to future research.
The distributions of quintile moves over the longer period come close to the
OECD country averages in the short period. The summary indicesM
S
are still
13
below the corresponding values for other countries in the shorter period. This
may be due to the dierent samples used. In the transition matrix analysis we
include more unstable employment careers.
To obtain a better overview of the development of wage mobility as the time
horizon is increased we apply the method suggested in Section 3.2. We calcu-
late the summary measure M
S
for increasing time horizons and plot the results
against the time axis. The slopes of these mobility curves signify how rapidly
incomes approach their permanent average values. A steep slope indicates that
income averaged over a further year reduces inequality considerably. As the
curve attens, averaged incomes are close to a permanent value and inequality
is not reduced further by mobility. Figure 1.1 reports the per cent reduction
in inequality over the eleven-year period for four dierent inequality indices.
As expected there is no indication that the full equalising eect of mobility is
exhausted within the rst six years. Approximately two thirds of the equal-
ising eect of averaging earnings over eleven years are realised after six years.
According to the dierent indices the percent reduction in inequality, when
averaging income over eleven years, amounts to four to ten per cent. Even
considering this long period the equalising eect of mobility in Austria is below
the values for the other countries after six years.
Figures 1.2 to 1.5 show the summary measures for dierent groups of workers.
Let us look at extreme cases. Workers with no change of employers have a
very stable development of wages, the degree of wage mobility is modest. It
is interesting to compare the curves for the two most mobile groups, which
are young workers and those with employer changes. For young workers, the
mobility curve seems to atten at the end of the observation period. This may
reect the transitory nature of income changes which young workers experience.
This kind of variation ends as the individuals arrives at a certain older age.
Employer changes, in contrast, seem to present permanent income changes,
which result in an almost linearly rising mobility curve.
The next part of the empirical analysis examines the distinction between within-
and between-group mobility. The sample is divided into 24 groups according
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to gender, age (three groups), occupation (2 groups) and change of employer (2
groups). In Table 6, we see that 38 per cent of cross-section inequality in 1986
is due to dierences in average earnings between the various groups, while the
larger part reects dierences within them. The third and fourth columns of
Table 6 show the total equalising eect of wage mobility and the share due to
cross-group convergence of average earnings. The between-group mobility eect
is always very weak and amounts to seven per cent at most. Thus the part of
mobility that can be explained by observable characteristics is moderate and
the equalising eect of mobility occurs predominantly within groups. Figure
3 plots these results graphically. We notice that while total mobility is rising
with longer time periods, the between share only rises up to 6 years and remains
stable after that. Which means, that only up to six years the explainable part
of mobility gains from increasing the time horizon.
4.3 Sensitivity of Summary Indices due to Censoring
In this section we try to assess the magnitude of the eect of top coding in the
wage data on the summary measures M
S
. From the denition of the index in
equations ( 4) and ( 5) it is not clear in which direction the censoring problem
might aect the indices. Using censored wage observations truncates the \true"
distribution of yearly wages and shifts the distribution of average wages to
the left. Consequently both, the weighted index of yearly inequality in the
denominator of ( 4) and the index of averaged inequality in the numerator are
underestimated and the eects on the mobility index are partly osetting each
other. As it is dicult to approximate the impact of censoring systematically we
add some empirical considerations. In the following we make several variations
to our data set and compare the eects on the indices for the total sample, men
and women separately.
1. We approximate the censored wages by a Pareto distribution, with param-
eters estimated from the upper part of the wage distribution. This method
is usually applied for inequality measurement (Gusenleitner et al., 1998)
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as the Pareto distribution is seen as a good approximation for the upper
part of the wage distribution (Cowell, 2000). Randomly assigning values
to the censored observations in the panel introduces extra mobility. But
now at least the denominator in equation ( 4) should be estimated more
precisely. Therefore the indices calculated with this method provide an
upper bound of mobility. From the results, given in Table 8, we learn
that for women the index hardly changes, whereas it rises considerably
for men. For the total sample the upper bound measure of mobility states
the equalising eect of mobility with 8.5%, which is 2 percentage points
higher than in the original sample. In comparison with other countries
(Table 3) this is still a low value of mobility.
2. We investigate the eect of extra censoring on the mobility index. In the
original sample 22% of male individuals are censored at least once during
1986-1991, but only 6% of females. We examine the eect of lowering the
contribution assessment ceiling so far that in the resulting sample about
20% of female individuals are censored. We nd that extra censoring
raises the index for all categories. This suggests that censoring actually
leads to an overestimation of mobility.
3. If we exclude all observations with wages lower than ve times the wage
for marginal work from the sample we will also drive most part-time
workers out of the sample. The eect on mobility is ambiguous. For
the total sample mobility increases, whereas in the male and female wage
distributions we nd less mobility.
4. In the original sample the wage for censored observations is set equal to
the contribution assessment ceiling. In this variant we examine the eect
of approximating these observations with estimated mean values (taken
from the Pareto distribution). This correction should at least give a better
approximation to inequality. It turns out that in this case we obtain the
smallest values for mobility. Again the results suggest an overestimation
of mobility by censoring.
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Summarising, the results of the variations on the sample we nd some evidence
for overestimating mobility by the use of censored wage observations. An ap-
proximation of the upper bound of mobility still shows that in Austria wage
mobility is comparatively low, especially for women. We also nd that the
minimum wages included in the analysis aect the mobility measure. On the
whole the summary indices appear to be quite sensitive to variations in the data
set and should be treated with caution if applied for comparative purposes on
dierent data sources.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we used administrative data to analyse the extent of wage mobility
in Austria for the time period 1986-96. We nd that mobility reduces wage
inequality by 3 - 7 per cent, depending on the inequality index chosen, when
a six-year time period is considered. For Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, UK, and USA the equalising eect of mobility is twice as large
as for Austria. As there is evidence that the equalising eect of wage mobility
on life-time incomes is not exhausted within six years we consider an eleven-
year horizon for Austria. Wage mobility increases slightly to 4 - 10 per cent.
Considering dierent groups of workers, we nd that wage mobility reduces the
cross-sectional inequality especially for younger workers and workers changing
employers during the observation period. A more formal decomposition into
within- and between-group mobility shows that the between-group mobility
eect is always very weak and amounts to seven per cent of total mobility at
most. This implies that the equalising eect of mobility occurs predominantly
within groups.
Compared to all countries, wage mobility in Austria seems to be extremely
low. Therefore we examine the validity of the results with respect to possible
problems with the data set, which are the inclusion of part-time workers and
censoring of wage data due to the contribution assessment ceiling of the social
security system. Highly robust indices are measures based on quintile transi-
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tions of men. Applying these measures in a comparison across OECD countries,
Austria is placed on the lower end of the ranking next to France. Young work-
ers, who are less aected by censoring, are a very mobile group in all countries.
The indices for Austria are lowest in country comparison, but the values are in
a comparable range. In Austria women are a highly immobile group although
their wages are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. According to
results of sensitivity analysis we nd some evidence for overestimating mobil-
ity by the use of censored wage observations. An approximation of the upper
bound of mobility still shows that in Austria wage mobility is comparatively
low, especially for women.
We argue that the results are in line with other evidence showing rigid relative
wage structures in Austria. An explanation would be that the pronounced
macroeconomic real wage exibility reduces the demand for micro exibility
(Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
However, we do not claim that the macroeconomic real wage exibility makes
micro exibility completely unnecessary. We can only conclude that micro
adjustments do not occur on the wage level. One important feature of the
Austrian labour market is the considerable amount of job turnover and large
gross ows between employment unemployment and out of the labour force.
These high quantity adjustments are induced at least partly by the rigidity
of the micro wage structures (Hofer et al., 2001). The current analysis is
concentrated on continuously employed wage earners. Therefore we cannot
investigate moves of wage earners to unemployment, self employment or out of
the labour force. We refer these interesting topics to future research.
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Table 1: Alternative measures of five-years earnings mobility for full-time wage and salary earners, 1986-1991
Cross-sectional
earnings inequality Total Sample Men in the male distribution
Stayed in Moved up Moved 2 or Stayed in Moved up Moved 2 or
Ratio of 90th to Average the same or down more Average the same or down more
10th percentile quintile move quintile one quintile quintiles quintile move quintile one quintile quintiles
wage, 1991 % % % % % %
Austria* 2.68 0.48 61.7 31.1 7.3 0.55 56.7 34.3 9.0
Denmark 2.15 0.76 47.6 35.6 16.8 0.78 46.3 36.5 17.2
Finland* 2.47 0.89 44.1 34.4 21.5
France 3.26 0.59 56.8 32.0 11.2 0.58 56.6 32.6 10.9
Germany 2.52 0.62 53.0 35.7 11.2 0.65 51.8 36.5 11.7
Italy 2.64 0.68 50.6 35.3 14.1 0.68 50.2 36.0 13.8
Sweden 2.11 0.68 52.7 33.8 13.5 0.77 46.3 38.4 15.3
UK 3.28 0.72 48.1 36.8 15.1
USA 3.66 0.73 48.8 35.5 15.7 0.79 46.6 35.7 17.7
* Austria and Finland all workers
Source: OECD (1996), own calculations
Transitions among quintiles
Inequality Index Austria Denmark France Germany Italy UK USA
Mean log deviation 6.6 11.0 11.0 15.3 12.1 11.4 11.9
Gini 2.5 5.5 4.3 4.5 5.6 5.7 4.8
Theil I1 5.7 10.9 13.7 12.7 11.3 11.8 10.5
Theil I2 5.4 11.7 27.2 18.6 11.6 15.6 12.5
Mean log deviation 5.6 11.3 11.1 8.7 11.4 11.1 11.6
Gini 2.1 5.6 4.2 3.6 5.3 5.7 4.9
Theil I1 4.8 11.5 14.4 10.2 11.0 11.9 10.3
Theil I2 4.6 12.5 29.7 19.7 11.4 16.6 12.2
Mean log deviation 8.2 19.7 19.0 22.3 26.6 19.3
Gini 3.0 5.9 5.6 6.2 5.9 5.0
Theil I1 6.9 12.9 12.0 15.5 15.9 10.9
Theil I2 6.3 10.2 11.8 17.3 11.7 10.5
* Austria all workers
Source: OECD (1997), own calculations
Table 2: Percentage reduction in single-year earnings when earnings are averaged over 1986-1991
Weekly/monthly earnings of continuously full-time workers*
Weekly/monthly earnings of continuously full-time workers, aged 25-49 only*
Annual earnings of all continuously employed workers
Austria Denmark France Germany Italy UK USA
Total 6.6 11.0 11.0 15.3 12.1 11.4 11.9
  Female 7.3 18.3 15.4 19.2 16.9 10.7 16.1
  Male 8.8 11.0 10.6 16.2 11.7 13.6 12.5
  Under 25 18.2 25.3 29.3 48.5 30.5 19.5 27.3
  25-34 8.2 14.9 15.4 12.3 16.3 14.7 14.7
  35-49 4.2 9.4 9.3 6.8 9.1 9.4 9.4
  50-64 2.8 6.0 8.4 6.9 9.7 8.8 8.9
  No change 3.4 6.1 10.2 11.7 9.2 9.9 8.1
  At least one change 13.2 15.5 15.8 24.5 18.8 13.2 17.3
*for Austria all workers
Source: OECD (1997), own calculations
Change of employer
Age
Table3: Percentage reduction in single-year earnings when earnings are averaged over 1986-1991, by worker characteristics
(Earnings inequality is measured by mean log deviation index)
Weekly/monthly earnings of continuously full-time workers*
Sex
Table 4:  Alternative measures of eleven-years earnings mobility for Austrian wage and salary earners, 1986-1996
Mobility Indices
Stayed in Moved up Moved 2 or Moving Moving Trace Bartholomew 2.Eigenvalue
Average the same or down more upwards downwards
quintile move quintile one quintile quintiles
% % % % %
Total 0.658 51.7 35.1 13.2 23.4 24.9 0.60 0.66 0.26
Female 0.632 54.4 32.1 13.5 24.5 21.1 0.61 0.63 0.23
Male 0.672 50.1 36.9 13.1 22.8 27.2 0.66 0.69 0.31
White-collar worker 0.662 54.8 30.3 14.9 26.6 18.7 0.64 0.58 0.27
Blue-collar worker 0.653 48.7 39.7 11.6 20.5 30.9 0.66 0.62 0.35
Age under 25 0.917 38.1 38.9 23.1 44.3 17.6 0.75 0.87 0.42
25-45 0.614 53.6 34.9 11.4 19.5 26.8 0.58 0.61 0.24
46-64 0.430 65.5 28.7 5.8 7.9 26.6 0.47 0.43 0.19
No change of employer 0.453 61.5 32.7 5.7 18.2 20.3 0.49 0.45 0.16
At least one change 0.810 44.3 36.9 18.8 27.3 28.4 0.69 0.81 0.36
Transitions among quintiles
Table 5: Percentage reduction in single-year inequality when earnings are averaged over 1986-96, by worker characteristics
MLD Gini Theil I1 Theil I2
Total 9.7 3.8 8.6 8.2
Female 10.1 4.3 8.8 8.2
Male 12.4 4.9 11.2 10.5
Age under 25 20.4 9.3 18.9 18.6
25-45 8.8 3.4 7.8 7.3
46-64 5.4 1.6 4.5 4.1
Blue-collar worker 11.2 5.6 10.7 10.9
White-collar worker 10.4 3.2 9.0 8.3
No change of employer 5.4 2.1 4.9 4.8
At least one change 15.0 6.2 13.3 12.5
Table 6: Earnings inequality and mobility "within" and "between" groups, 1986-1996
(Inequality is measured by the mean log deviation index)
Total "Between" share Total "Between" share
Earnings averaged Inequality of total inequality* Mobility of total mobility*
over (percent) (percent)
1986 0.074 37.7 0.0 x
1986-87 0.070 38.3 2.0 2.8
1986-88 0.068 38.7 3.3 3.6
1986-89 0.066 38.9 4.5 4.5
1986-90 0.063 39.0 5.7 5.6
1986-91 0.061 39.0 6.7 6.5
1986-92 0.059 39.0 7.6 6.9
1986-93 0.058 39.0 8.2 6.9
1986-94 0.057 39.0 8.8 6.7
1986-95 0.056 39.0 9.2 6.5
1986-96 0.056 39.1 9.7 6.3
x: not applicable
a) The total work force is dived into 24 groups defined by sex (2 groups), age(3 groups), worker-type (2 groups) and change of employer (2 groups).
Inequality Index Mobility Index
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
N % N %
Total 19,504 100.0 14,912 100.0
Female 7,149 36.7 4,801 32.2
Male 12,355 63.3 10,111 67.8
Age under 25 3,954 20.3 2,269 15.2
25-45 13,651 70.0 10,906 73.1
46-64 1,895 9.7 1,737 11.6
Blue-collar worker 10,003 51.3 7,516 50.4
White-collar worker 9,501 48.7 7,396 49.6
No change of employer 8,314 42.6 8,069 54.1
At least one change 11,174 57.3 6,837 45.8
Maximum censored 2,544 13.0 2,285 15.3
Individuals employed more than 180 days in 
1986 and 1996
Individuals continuously employed 
more than 180 days 1986 - 1996
Table 8: Variations of the sample, mobility calculated by Mean Log Deviation index, observation period 1986 - 1991.
Total Sample Men Women 
Original Sample 6.6 7.3 8.8
Approximation with Pareto distribution 8.6 7.5 12.3
Introduction of extra censoring 7.6 7.7 11.0
Increased minimum wage 7.1 5.9 8.1
Mean Value for censored observations 5.8 6.6 7.1
Figure 1.1
Figure 1.2 Figure 1.3
Figure 1.4 Figure 1.5
Figure 1: Summary measure of mobility to establish how mobility reduces inequality as the 
time horizon increases. Different inequality indices in 1.1, different worker characteristics in 1.2 
- 1.5 (mobility index based on the mean log deviation measure).
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Figure 2: Summary measure of mobility to establish how mobility reduces inequality as the 
time horizon increases. Different OECD countries (mobility indices based on the mean log 
deviation measure).
Figure 3: Development of total mobility and the between share of mobility as the time horizon 
increases (mobility indices based on the mean log deviation measure).
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